Group-level cognitive states are widely observed in human social systems, but their discussion is often ruled out a priori in quantitative approaches. In this paper, we show how reference to the irreducible mental states and psychological dynamics of a group is necessary to make sense of large scale social phenomena. We introduce the problem of mental boundaries by reference to a classic problem in the evolution of cooperation. We then provide an explicit quantitative example drawn from ongoing work on cooperation and conflict among Wikipedia editors. We show the limitations of methodological individualism, and the substantial benefits that come from being able to refer to collective intentions and attributions of cognitive states of the form "what the group believes" and "what the group values."
Introduction
Accounts of the history and structure of human behavior naturally attribute cognitive properties not just to individuals, but to groups. They do so despite strong methodological rules against such talk [1] : fields as varied as political science, history, anthropology and economics make constant reference to the attitudes, expectations, beliefs, and values of groups. Scholars talk about the desires and strategies of a social class [30] , the expectations of financial markets [27] , or the attitudes of a nation [14] . It is generallyusually implicitly-understood that talk about group-level mental states is not simple shorthand for talk about the mental states of individuals. The relationship between (for example) "society's values" and the behaviors and beliefs of its citizens, or "the beliefs of the committee" and those of its members, is at best only partially understood.
Reference to group-level cognitive properties in the social sciences has thus been contentious [52] . Yet the idea of minds overlapping and nesting comes naturally to those in artificial intelligence, where mind is understood solely as computation. As far back as 1967, Marvin Minsky wrote that "the question of where a particular machine ends and its environment begins can be settled only by a convention or definition" (Ref. [36] , Pg. 19) and urged that methodological criteria alone settle the question of where boundaries should be drawn.
The very success of the traditional psychological sciences points to the empirical utility of the biological boundary. In this article we provide a scientific account of how that boundary can be violated in informal, self-organizing social systems.
We shall show how reference to the irreducible mental states, and psychological dynamics, of a group mind is necessary to build sensible mathematical theories of large scale social phenomena. To do so, we provide an explicit example drawn from ongoing work on cooperation and conflict among Wikipedia editors [10] . Section 1, "Joint Machines and Social Variables", introduces our account of group minds by reference to the finite state machines. We show how the desire to describe relevant coarse-grained properties of interacting machines leads naturally to the use of computational states that are disjunctive unions of the underlying mental states of the individuals involved. Section 2, "Group Minds in Wikipedia," provides an empirical example of how the considerations suggested by the toy models of Section 1 play out the empirical dynamics of cooperation and conflict on Wikipedia. We build intuition for the problem by reference to a finite-state model of behavior among a large group of heterogenous agents, and find the Nash Equilibrium explicitly. We then show how reference to the properties of group minds is essential for a parsimonious account of real-world behavior. Section 3, "Conclusions", places these results in a larger context, connecting our work to recent work in neuroscience, complex systems, and political science.
Joint Machines and Social Variables
Finite-state machines model individuals as cognitively-limited transducers: conditional upon an environmental input and the current internal state, the individual produces a behavioral output and changes state. As the name suggests, the individual has only a finite number of possible internal states, and thus an explicitly bounded number of response-patterns. Such machines provide a highly simplified account of the cognition, with internal states associated with a mental state or "disposition".
The famous "tit for tat" (T4T) solution for iterated prisoner's dilemma is a particularly simple example. Written as a finite-state machine ( Fig. 1(a) ), T4T has two internal states, C and D, which both name the internal state and dictate the machine's next action, cooperate or defect. Depending on the action previously observed, it shifts between these two states (Fig. 1a ). An opponent's defection (d signal) in the current round shifts the machine to state D, and it will defect in the next round.
Computational Macrostates
The T4T solution gained great attention in the early computational study of the emergence of altruism and social cooperation. It did so both because of its natural interpretation in terms of (stylized) facts about social conventions, and because of its behavior under noise: T4T is "forgiving", and allows opposing strategies to recover from an accidental defect.
This can be seen in Fig. 1(b) , where we show the joint machine that emerges when two T4T strategies interact on a noisy channel. Each state of Fig. 1(b) corresponds to a joint specification of the underlying computational states of the two individuals. With some probability ǫ, a transmitted symbol is flipped to its opposite; it is this flipped symbol that is both received by the other machine and determines the payoff in that round. Noise can send a cooperative pair into a cycle of alternating, or even mutual, defection, but with non-zero probability of recovering the cooperative solution.
In the T4T joint machine, the states of the system are also causal states of the finegrained system [7] ; knowledge of the current play (CC vs. CD, and so forth) tells us everything we need to know about the future probabilities of action.
When it comes to building accounts of social systems, we are necessarily concerned with aggregate properties; a theory of social systems is not an account of the complete psychological states of the individuals, but is rather phrased in terms of social variables that summarize these underlying states in relevant ways. As an example, we may be interested not in the dynamics of the individual psychological states of the T4T machines, but only in the (absolute) inequality of outcome. In prisoner's dilemma, the absolute difference in payoff is either zero (for CC and DD-both "win" or both lose) or ∆ (greater than zero; in the case where one player receives the payoff w > 0, and the other player receives the "sucker's payoff", s < 0).
These coarse-grained equivalence classes define the macrostates [40] of a higher-level theory; in Ref. [9] we referred to the inferred dynamics of these macrostates as effective theories. In the joint-T4T case, the macrostates are, again, causal states: knowledge of the current payoff inequality tells the observer everything she needs to know about the future behavior of the system. (Macrostates need not be causal states, as can be seen in for a 0/∆ coarse-graining in the interaction of two "tit-for-two-tats" (T42T) strategies, where T42T is defined as "defect if and only if defected against twice in a row.") A coarse-graining that refers unambiguously to the state of one, and only one, of the two individuals-e.g., a coarse-graining to CC-or-CD and DC-or-DD-does not provide causal states and thus can, at best, provide only imperfect predictions of future behavior. By contrast, it is easy to construct situations in which the 0/∆ macrostates-and only these macrostates-are relevant to a third-party observer. For example, one can augment the prisoner's dilemma with a third player who "wins" if she correctly picks the inequality level. In this case, the third player never has cause to refer to states of the individual players; she need only refer to disjunctive unions (CC-or-DD vs. CD-or-DC).
The desire to talk about coarse-grained properties of a system leads us to theories whose basic units are disjunctive unions of joint mental states. In this simple case, there is no need to refer to the properties of individuals; not only is our theory simpler when we work at the group-level, we lose no predictive power.
From Machine to Mind
The previous section provided a toy example of the Minsky intuition: that computational accounts of behavior remain agnostic about the boundaries between interacting systems. We have further shown how the social variables relevant to a third agent may mean that the relative computational states of the system do not uniquely and separately identify the mental states of individuals.
Finite-state accounts, however, leave much to be desired. They provide no real space for intentionality, or the "aboutness" of internal states; it is only by strained analogy, for example, that one can claim a finite-state machine believes something about its environment.
In addition, our use of only two (or three) individuals allows us to demonstrate only a very limited gain from reference to joint mental states. Let us take an informal example. One might refer to a store as "friendly" if at least one of its two clerks decides to help. But such an attribution, of a mental state (willingness to help) to a group agent ("the store"), provides little gain over and above the statement that "at least one of the two clerks was willing to help", and this latter statement makes no reference to mental properties other than those of the individual agents.
Finally, it is hard to see in these simple examples how someone could come to know the macrostate without coming to know the microstate. The reason I call a store friendly is precisely because I've observed a "normal" mental property of one of the clerks, and similar objections would appear to apply in any natural account of coming to know the macrostates of Fig. 1(c) .
When both the number of individuals and the space of possible behaviors is small, in other words, talk of group minds may be easily schematized-but provides only limited benefit. In the next section, we will see how they become essential in the description of large-scale social phenomena.
Group Minds in Wikipedia
In this section, we will demonstrate that observed behavior on Wikipedia urges us to postulate the existence of group-level cognitive states and laws.
The Wikipedia System
Founded in 2001, the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia has been a source of scholarly attention for over a decade [2] . While the legally-recognized Wikimedia Foundation has on the order of 100 employees, day-to-day behavior of the 10 5 volunteer editors is guided by a set of overlapping policies, guidelines, permanent and ad hoc committees, formal and informal rules, a range of behavioral norms and cultural practices, and (perhaps most importantly) the pragmatic expectations pseudonymous users form of each other.
Such a large population ends up a cohesive, though far from conflict-free, culture that has been the source of ethnographic studies [38, 25] , interventional experiments (e.g., Refs. [26, 48] ) and quantitative observational studies (e.g., Refs. [32, 53, 20] ). From around 2006 to 2012, the number of "active" volunteer editors ranged between 20,000 and 60,000; the plateau and then decline in the number of users identified by Ref. [21] points to the long-term evolution of a project that six years previously underwent rapid growth.
Social Norms, Page Reverts, and a Square-Root Law
To study the characteristics of this system, we focus on the page-by-page time-series of "reverts" in the encyclopedia. Reverts-informally, when one editor "undoes" the work of another-are an excellent tracer of short-term conflict [28] ; they also play a central role in the social norms of the larger Wikipedia community, where users discuss "Edit Warring" (repeated undoing of other's work) in depth, and the "three revert rule" (do not revert more than three times on a single page) makes direct reference to the behavior as a bright line for policy violation.
1 Though necessarily imperfect, automated identification of reverts allows us to track sites of conflict over ∼ 10 6 individual actions by ∼ 10 5 editors, 2 spread over a set of 62 highly-edited pages. We focus on the statistics of "continued non-reversion" which we refer to informally as "cooperative runs". In particular, we study how the probability that the next edit will be a revert declines as a function of time since the last revert. The phenomenological form of this law was found in Ref. [10] to be
where P (R|RC k ) is the probability that one sees a revert edit after exactly-k nonreverting edits, and p and α are constants. Empirically, α ranges between 0.4 and 0.8, with an average (in our current data-set) of 0.57 ± 0.02, an approximate inverse square-root scaling of propensity to revert with length of cooperative run.
We are concerned only with how that small section of history, running backwards from the current edit to the most recent revert, affects behavior; explicitly, our measurements average out over variety of larger contexts that change on longer timescales. This allows us to build up sufficient statistical power to study the detailed structure of the conditional behavior described by Eq. 1.
The timescales of these runs are indeed short. Fig. 2 shows the cumulative distribution of timescales of cooperation for a sample of 171, 107 cooperative runs measured over 62 highly-edited pages. Although occasional long-tail events are possible, more than 80% of the time, a page in our sample can not go more than a day without a revert. Only a small number of cooperative runs last longer than a week; many of these observations come from early in the encyclopedia's history, and concern less controversial topics. On the other extreme, a small fraction of cooperative runs (2.5%) are over (i.e., terminated by a revert) in less than a minute.
Cooperative events are not only reasonably rapid, but also highly social. Fig. 3 shows the distribution of the number of users involved in these runs. For k > 1, over 85% of all runs involve at least three users, and the longest runs can draw in dozens. Interactions over and above the commonly-studied dyadic, or pair-wise, case are essential to the phenomenology we observe.
This sociality involves users who may engage for only short periods. Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distribution of "residence times"-the elapsed time between the first and last edit made by a particular user on a particular page. While the timescale of user engagement is broad, spanning nearly eight orders of magnitude, more than half of users have a total engagement time of less than a day.
We will return to these three facts-concerning the rapidity, sociality, and turnover of the community-when we come to modify and extend the simple game-theoretic account we present in the following section.
The Assistance Stage Game for Wikipedia
This section presents a game theoretic model of revert behavior on Wikipedia. Such a rational-choice account will provide a guide for how to map, in a rigorous fashion, cognitive states-beliefs about the world-to actions. As we shall see, these standard models fall short of describing real-world behavior: they require us to believe implausible facts about individuals.
We model the decision problem faced by users as a game of perfect, but incomplete, information [31] . Our model is emphatically minimal : rather than propose a full account of the motives and contexts for individual editors, we construct a parsimonious account consistent with the most basic facts about interaction on Wikipedia.
In particular, we introduce three important facts that constitute distinctive features of Wikipedia-like systems. Though only imperfectly observed in the real world, these facts capture the sources of knowledge and uncertainty most relevant to system function.
Firstly: no top-down agency chooses which user next edits a page. The order in which users edit, and the identity of who will edit next, is uncertain. In this first analysis we approximate the arrival of users as an iid process.
Secondly: the page history is visible to users; individuals are aware when those who come before have chosen to revert. This defines the information available to users.
Thirdly: individuals have only incomplete information about the motives and desires of their fellow users. We model this incompleteness as an uncertainty about whether the 6 next user will perceive the revert/don't-revert choice as (on the one hand) a problem of misaligned incentives or (on the other) a problem of aligned incentives and mutualism.
To do this, we construct an extensive-form stage game with a randomly-selected individual making a single choice: to revert (R), or cooperate (C). Her payoff for this move is the sum of two games, one played with the individual who edited just-previously, and the other played with the next editor to appear. The payoff matrix of each game is of the form
where ǫ is a constant, 0 < c < w, and s < 0. We model a heterogeneous population of players using θ 1 and θ 2 , random variables between zero and unity. These are chosen once (and for all time) for each player, and boost the payoff associated with the normative action.
As an example, say that the player in question, Alice, chooses to not to revert; say further that the previous player, Walrus, also chose not to revert; say finally that the player after Alice, Carpenter, responds to Alice by choosing to revert. Alice's payoff is (c + ǫθ 1 ) + (s + ǫθ 1 ). This is her CC payoff from cooperating with Walrus, plus the negative "sucker's payoff", s, from being reverted by Carpenter. On making her move, Alice is aware of Walrus's choice, but does not know the identity (or move choice) of the next player.
Depending on the value of ǫ and θ 1 , Alice's payoff might be positive (because of her cooperation with Walrus, and a general desire to follow social norms against reverting), or negative. Meanwhile, we do not know what Carpenter's final payoff will be until the player after him makes a move, but we know that it is either w (if the next person reverts) or 2w (if the next person cooperates).
The random variable governs the uncertainty a user has about her fellow-user's perception of the game; to be clear, Alice knows her θ value (and thus whether she likes to revert others, or prefers to find a cooperative solution), but does not know the character of the next editor. When formulating her strategies for play, therefore, she will have to estimate her utility in the face of uncertain knowledge of others.
What Alice Believes about Walrus and the Carpenter
We can make Alice as intelligent as we like, but what sets the complexity of her behavior are the beliefs she holds about the people she encounters.
We shall (at first) give Alice uncharitable views of the sophistication of her fellow editors. In particular, we shall have her believe that editors condition their behavior solely on whether the previous editor did, or did not, revert. She has, in other words, two beliefs: β c (the probability that the next editor will revert her, given that she cooperated) and β r (the probability that the next editor will revert her, given that she reverted).
Let us say the previous editor, Walrus, cooperated. Then Alice's best response (she will reason) is to cooperate if and only if
This inequality should be easy to read; the first term (on the lhs) is the benefit to cooperating with Walrus; the second term (in square brackets) is the expected benefit to cooperating with the next editor, given expectations about the next editor's strategies. The third and fourth terms (on the rhs) are (respectively) the (now known) payoff from reverting Walrus, and the expected gain given the possibility that the next user will cooperate (with probability 1 − β r ). Conversely, and by similar reasoning, if Walrus reverted, Alice's best response is cooperation if and only if
If Alice has no way of predicting the identity of the next editor, and (furthermore) if she truly believes her fellow editors can hold no more sophisticated a memory than C-vs-R-among other things, for example, if she believes that editors do not respond to, or cannot perceive, "punishment"-then she might as well choose the action that most benefits her. In other words, Alice herself will adopt the strategy "cooperate after cooperation" if and only if her θ 1 is such that the inequality of Eq. 3 is satisfied; similarly, she will cooperate with a reverter only if the inequality of Eq. 4 is satisfied.
The final stage of the argument is to find the fixed point where beliefs about the system lead to actions that maintain the truth of those beliefs.
3 If we ask the population as a whole to reason as Alice does, then the probability that the inequality Eq. 3 holds is just the probability that θ for the individual in question is large enough, in particular that
and for beliefs to be consistent with the actions observed, this probability has to equal 1 − β c . A similar argument applies to the satisfaction of Eq. 4, and, with two equations and two unknowns, we can solve for the self-consistent solution to the beliefs β c and β r . The general solution is the ratio of polynomials; for the particular case where the disgruntlement, s, on being reverted is equal to c − w, β c and β r are equal and the expected behavior is particularly simple,
where (w − c)/ǫ is a constant.
Three Theses for a Group Mind
Eq. 6 is clearly incompatible with the observed phenomenology, Eq. 1. This is to be expected: the assistance stage game makes assumptions that we believe are naturally violated in the real world. But Eq. 6 does give us a clear account of how we can alter the model by hand. All we have to do is make ǫ a function of k-indeed, a very simple function of k, ǫ(k) ∝ k α -and we can recover Eq. 1 instantly. Changing ǫ amounts to doing two things simultaneously. First, it amounts to changing the overall balance in the system: shifting agents away from seeing Wikipedia as a series of one-shot prisoner's dilemma games, and towards a mutualistic viewpoint that sees cooperation, even at risk of revert, as intrinsically good. Second, and equally importantly, it amounts to changing the beliefs that individuals have about others. This simple argument, based on long-understood features of game-theoretic models, suggests the first thesis of this section.
Thesis one. For behavior to shift in the fashion we observe, both beliefs and desires must change in a systematic fashion.
Belief change with k will naturally occur in the real world. We expect that real Wikipedia users are playing sophisticated strategies, with potentially greater look-back times and sensitivity to features of the system such as the usernames, talk pages, and user pages of the editors currently active. Over the minutes and hours that elapse during the unbroken non-reverting sessions we examine here, they will naturally come to change their future expectations.
At the same time, we believe not only that the payoff matrix we present above is an approximation to reality, but that preference change among Wikipedia users is also expected. It may be endogenously driven-I may simply enjoy cooperating more when others around me appear to be cooperating-or may be due to complicated mechanisms involving reputation effects that we know to be in effect in other public goods games.
Both beliefs and preferences will be driven by the changing state of the page itself. Pages will improve (or degenerate) over time, and the evolving state of the page will drive users (or their programmers, in the case of bots) towards (or away) from cooperation. The iid assumption will fail as changing conditions shift the composition of the pool of active editors.
The rapid formation of these cooperative runs (Fig. 2) argues that these effects are unlikely to arise from a top-down process; the involvement of multiple users (Fig. 3) further increases the complexity of the task. The timescales of community turn-over for any particular page, shown in Fig. 4 , further suggests that users do not have significant time to learn the detailed preferences and strategies of individual users. Both theoretical and empirical considerations, therefore, suggest we adopt a second thesis:
Thesis two. The cognitive laws we can infer from Eq. 1 do not simply reduce to direct accounts of mental states of individual editors. Sec. 2.4 showed us how to infer beliefs and preferences from actions; but both mechanistic and theoretical considerations make it unlikely that these beliefs ("the next person will revert with probability proportional to k −α ") and preferences ("my desire to follow social norms experiences an increase proportional to k −α ") correspond to the beliefs or desires of any user whatsoever.
Users are more limited (in the extent to which they can gather information about behavioral patterns), more nuanced in their desires, and likely attribute greater cognitive complexity to each other. At the same time, the observed behavior can be explained by reference to such beliefs and desires; the question is then to whom should they be attributed.
Together, these two theses-a positive thesis connecting behavior to cognitive state, and a negative thesis preventing direct identification of those cognitive states with those of any individual-urge us to accept a third thesis, and the main result of our paper: 9
Thesis three. The reliability of Eq. 1 should be explained by the existence of psychological laws pertaining to group-level mental states.
Different disciplines have different traditions for talking about mental states and laws of this form. Economics, as mentioned above, has little difficulty referring to the beliefs of "the market" without necessarily attributing these beliefs to any participant [22] . Political scientists study core features of civil conflict by reference to group-level values and ideologies, even (and, indeed, particularly) when these conflict with the beliefs of group members [39] . Other fields, such as intellectual history, may talk about such states by reference to an idealized individual, whose cognitive features are understood by comparison to biographical accounts of actual thinkers [23] .
Conclusion
This paper has worked through a minimal model of interaction on a large-scale networked social system. We showed how game theoretic notions provided us a rigorous framework within which to move from observations of behavior to knowledge about beliefs and other mental states. The complex and networked structure of the system strongly suggests that we attribute these states to group-level cognitive processes.
Our basic model for interaction locates the struggle for sociality on Wikipedia in the extent to which users perceive the problem as a one-shot prisoner's dilemma, as opposed to a mutualistic interaction where the greatest benefits accrue to joint norm-following. This places our account of Wikipedia on the continuum between those who identify the origin of social complexity in altruism and group selection, vs. those who see the burden on the side of cognitive ability (see, e.g., extended discussion in Refs. [45, 4] ).
The recursive nature of both problems means that it not only the perception of users that matters, but their beliefs about the perceptions of others, and so forth. The fixed point solution we describe in Sec. 2.3 implicitly assumes the existence of common knowledge. Real-world studies show that, at best, individuals only approximate such solutions [16] ; indeed, results of this form, as well as theoretical arguments against the existence of true common knowledge [19] , strengthen our thesis two above-not only will individuals have more complex beliefs and shifting desires than the group-level beliefs, but they will reason in some bounded-rational fashion when deciding to act.
That group-level cognitive states appear to obey reasonably simple laws means not only that outside, scientific observers can form parsimonious descriptions of the system. It also means that such knowledge is potentially available to individuals within the system. Reference to "how cooperative the group is" will likely form part of an individual user's reasoning. Such forms of pattern recognition are known to play a role in both human [18] and animal sociality [8] . Minds may be nested within minds; recent work has uncovered the existence of multiple populations of editor activity [41] within Wikipediasuch populations are to be expected, and parallel the discovery of distinct group strategies found in animal sociality [13] , where triadic and higher-level decision-making is likely to be active [12] .
Our results here are complementary to recent work on the quantification of group agency established in a series of influential papers by List and Pettit [33, 34, 35] . This work establishes that while some limit cases may be trivial (everyone believes X, and so "the group believes X"), theorems on preference aggregation mean that the relationship 10 between individual and group-level mental states is complex. Under List and Pettit's analysis, some groups may fail to be true agents able to form intentional beliefs ("minds," in our language) because of the relations between the individuals that compose these groups. For List and Pettit, the ascription requires that individuals dynamically respond to each other in sufficiently cooperative ways. We have no such constraint, but anticipate that only in groups with sufficiently aligned incentives, or sufficient commitments to norm creation and rule-following, will large-scale cognitive laws be useful sources of knowledge. Our account is complementary to an influential strand of thought that locates the boundaries of mind-and, in particular, of unitary experience-by reference to the degree of integration between subparts [46, 47, 37] . There is no question in this case that, at least on longer timescales (hours to days), users do not interact frequently enough via the Wikipedia interface to justify a claim that these cognitive states are accompanied by qualitative experience. The interaction between users and distributed, higher-level properties associated with group-level beliefs has important commonalities with current thinking on the emergence of live [51, 50, 24] , and with accounts of multi-level selection in evolutionary systems [49] .
Our work connects directly to philosophical accounts of the Group Mind hypothesis [42, 44, 43] , in as much as it takes the cognitive states of these larger, non-biological units seriously. When individuals interact in sufficiently complex ways, the same reasons for including features of the external, physical world as part of a cognitive process [6, 5] may apply to the inclusion of the cognitive states of others. These aggregate processesgroup minds-will naturally have mental properties that differ from the individual minds out of which they are constructed. The existence of group-level cognitive states argues for cognitive approaches to the evolution of societies, including the quantification of their inferential and informationtheoretic properties [11] , potentially over timescales longer than an individual lifespan [29] . Our work is thus of direct relevance to a long-standing debate in the social and historical sciences [15] . What is the natural unit of analysis for long-term historical change, or the behavior of large groups? Methodological individualism necessarily reduces all talk of group-level beliefs, including accounts of culture and institutions, to the individual [3, 4] . From Sec. 1 we know that it is (of course) not impossible to give an account of group-level mental states (the macrostate) in terms of individual mental states (the microstate)-only that, as we see in Sec. 2.5, it may become extremely unwieldy, requiring us to explain simple laws in terms of an enormous number of fine-tuned processes. Figure 2 : Cooperation is rapid... Most cooperative runs last less than twenty-four hours. Plotted is the cumulative distribution of clock-times, for 171, 107 RC k R runs measured on 62 highly-edited pages, showing that the timescales over which we measure behavioral changes are usually much shorter than day-to-week timescales of exogenous events, and the week-to-year timescales of Wikipedia policy changes. Figure 3: ...and social. Most cooperative runs involve multi-user interactions. Over 85% of all runs with k > 1 involve at least three parties; for longer runs, RC k R with k greater than five, over 97% of interactions involve at least three parties. The very longest runs, k > 20, involve a median of twelve editors. Here we counts the unique users responsible for the k C edits and the terminal R, so that (for example) a run of length k = 2 can have at most three unique editors. Figure 4 : The majority of users have only short-term engagement with a page. Plotted here is the cumulative distribution of user longevity-the length of time that elapses between the first and last observed edit on a page-over 62 highly-edited pages. More than half of users have a total engagement time of less than a day; only a small fraction (less than 10%) of users are engaged with editing a page for more than a year.
